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Abstract 
Bangladesh and Pakistan had very different experiences with aid after 1971. Politics in Pakistan 
was less inclusive in terms of opportunities for intermediate (middle- and lower-middle-) class 
political entrepreneurs, and the dominance of military aid to Pakistan exacerbated the problem 
by allowing the top leadership to continue to rule without sharing much power with these 
classes. This not only had negative effects on the evolution of Pakistan’s politics but also 
slowed down the growth of a broad-based manufacturing sector. In contrast, in Bangladesh the 
less centralized organization of political power and less concentrated forms of aid allowed 
intermediate class political entrepreneurs to improve their access to resources and created 
opportunities for many of them to enter productive manufacturing activities like the garments 
industry. Neither country has moved toward good governance, nevertheless differences in 
patterns of aid can help explain significant differences in economic and political outcomes in 
the two countries. These experiences challenge conventional ideas about the relationship 
between aid, good governance, and security. Designing aid policies better so that aid can assist 
developing countries to improve their economic and political viability therefore requires a 
better understanding of the complex relationships between aid and the political economies of 
recipient countries.  
Keywords: aid; democracy; institution building; governance; security; Pakistan; Bangladesh; 
South Asia 
Biography: Mushtaq H. Khan is a professor of economics at SOAS, University of London. 
Contact: mk100@soas.ac.uk 
1 
The different experiences of Bangladesh and Pakistan since 1971 are relevant for 
understanding how aid can affect governance in vulnerable recipient countries where states 
face serious economic and political challenges. Aid does affect the development prospects of 
such countries but in more complex ways than is often assumed. The cases of Bangladesh and 
Pakistan challenge the idea that aid can be used to achieve what is described as “good 
governance.” However, the interaction between types of aid and preexisting political and 
governance structures can result in positive or negative outcomes for economic development 
and political stability. It is interesting to compare Bangladesh and Pakistan because they were 
the same country until 1971 when a civil war, followed by a war of independence, led to the 
emergence of Bangladesh. Bangladesh was poorer and less developed, and was famously 
written off by Henry Kissinger as a “basket case” dependent on aid. Both countries had 
vulnerable democracies after 1971, with interludes of military governments. Both received 
roughly 50 billion dollars of foreign aid in nominal terms in the 40 years following 1971. While 
both remain poor and vulnerable to internal conflicts, Bangladesh has arguably made greater 
progress given its starting point, while Pakistan has become more fragile. Pakistan’s per capita 
GDP was higher in 1971 and remained so in 2011, but economic growth has been faster in 
Bangladesh since the 1990s and the gap in per capita GDP between the two countries has 
narrowed significantly. Bangladesh has also done better in terms of a number of social 
indicators with more rapid progress in areas such as infant mortality. Its manufacturing sector 
has grown more rapidly, creating jobs for millions in the garments industry, while industrial 
growth in Pakistan has languished. The most striking difference is that despite intense internal 
conflicts in its early years, Bangladesh has moved toward somewhat lower levels of internal 
violence and greater political stability (though progress remains vulnerable to reverses) while 
Pakistan appears to have moved in the opposite direction.  
 
 Aid is clearly just one factor among many that may explain the divergent trajectories 
of the two countries. Despite the common elements in their histories, there are important 
differences. Bangladesh is a more homogenous country and the war of independence mobilized 
many people, particularly in the “intermediate” (middle- and lower-middle-) classes, to expect 
greater participation and progress. Many of these expectations were not realized and indeed 
created much turbulence in the years after independence. But the less centralized organization 
of political power in Bangladesh allowed many more individuals from the intermediate classes 
to enter politics and capture legal and illegal income flows or “rents.”  This process involved 
ambitious individuals acting as ‘political entrepreneurs’ and organizing their supporters to put 
pressure on higher level politicians to allow or enable their group to capture rents. This type of 
patron-client politics has social costs in terms of resource diversion and political corruption but 
it can in some contexts also have a social benefit in stabilizing the polity by creating 
opportunities for ambitious and potentially disruptive groups to incrementally acquire political 
power and resources (Khan 2010, 2012a). In Pakistan too there was a political opening under 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the early 1970s, but this was largely driven from above and many of the 
old elites continued to dominate the political process. In Pakistan, intermediate class political 
organizers did not have the organizational power to challenge the resource allocation decisions 
of higher elites to anything like the same extent. But emerging patterns of aid to Pakistan also 
helped higher elites to further consolidate their position. The failure of the Pakistani political 
system to rapidly absorb intermediate class political organizers was further exacerbated by the 
eventual loss of legitimacy suffered by Pakistan’s ruling elites as a result of their later support 
for U.S. interventions in the region. This combination of factors was to have dire consequences 
for the internal stability of Pakistan. Aid played a role in this because Pakistan’s position as a 
frontline state for the U.S. meant that security and military aid were much more important here 
than in Bangladesh. An important characteristic of security-related aid is that it is controlled 
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by a limited number of state and political leaders. Leaders can gain control of enough resources 
to try and stay in power by buying support from poorer social groups while repressing the 
ambitions of other intermediate class political entrepreneurs. As a political strategy this may 
work for a while but is unlikely to be viable in the long run as resentment is likely to grow 
within the excluded intermediate classes. Finally, security-related aid is volatile and flows can 
also change dramatically with changes in the strategic perceptions of donors.   
 
 Particularly unfortunate for Pakistan was the fact that two periods of military rule in the 
1980s and 2000s coincided with periods when the United States pumped military and security 
aid into Pakistan to buy its support in regional conflicts. The combination of military 
governments with large flows of security-related aid to the top leadership blocked the evolution 
and incorporation of political organizations led by the intermediate classes, with significantly 
adverse effects on the economic and political dynamics of the country. In contrast, in 
Bangladesh, the allocation of mainly civilian aid could not be tightly controlled by a few 
individuals. To stay in power, the political leadership had to continuously incorporate new 
political entrepreneurs from the intermediate classes, allowing them to progressively enter the 
ranks of the political elites. In addition, because they did not control much aid on their own, 
ruling elites had greater compulsions to support the development of productive capacity to 
accommodate their clients and to generate resources for themselves. Political regimes in 
Bangladesh therefore actively supported industrialization to a much greater extent in their own 
self-interest. Differences in the composition and types of aid to the two countries thus 
reinforced pre-existing differences in their social organization. 
 
 The effective exclusion of much of the intermediate classes from access to political 
resources, or rents, was an important contributory factor behind the growing political violence 
in Pakistan, particularly in the 2000s. Radical and extremist political entrepreneurs gradually 
found space to operate in this context of social discontent and poor economic performance, 
paradoxically making it easier for state elites to argue for even more security-related aid. In 
contrast in Bangladesh, while the political competition between opposing parties was intense 
and often violent, excluded political entrepreneurs could expect to gain access to rents through 
‘normal’ competitive political processes if they were sufficiently successful as organizers. 
Ruling elites did not control enough resources to try and stay in power by using repression or 
trying to exclude new political aspirants. As a result, even though the competition between 
political factions and parties often ended in violent confrontations, political organizations in 
Bangladesh were not trying to violently overthrow the state or the political system as a whole.  
 
 This analytical narrative of aid and its development impact challenges two conventional 
views about the relationship among aid, governance, and development. The first is that in 
developing countries, such as Bangladesh, that score poorly on “good governance,” aid should 
be used to strengthen progress toward “good governance” (Hermes and Lensink 2001). The 
experience of Bangladesh suggests that progress on good governance can be slow and 
development has to be achieved with limited prior improvements in good governance. In these 
contexts, political stability often depends on an appropriate allocation of rents to powerful 
political organizations, and economic development depends on support for firms and sectors to 
allow and to compel them to develop their competitiveness. Aid to Bangladesh was relatively 
more developmental because it supported some of these processes; the challenge is to move 
ahead with incremental institutional and policy changes that can sustain and deepen this 
progress 
 
 A second consensus view is that aid to countries, such as Pakistan, that suffer from 
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more severe security challenges should support improvements in security in addition to good 
governance (World Bank 2011). The experience of Pakistan challenges this view because 
increased security-related aid was associated with a steep decline in the legitimacy of the state 
and an increase in violence. The achievement of political stability requires a distribution of 
resources across competing political groups commensurate with their organizational power. 
Violence can break out when the ruling coalition does not recognize the organizational 
capabilities of some groups and refuses to give them commensurate access to rents. The 
problem of violence in these contexts cannot be solved (as the consensus view argues) by 
combining the delivery of public goods to “citizens” with greater security expenditures. States 
cannot buy off powerfully organized discontent in this way. If external security support is 
provided to a government that faces violent opposition because it has not achieved an 
acceptable distribution of rents, it is likely to use more force to sustain exclusion rather than 
use the opportunity to renegotiate a more stabilizing distribution of rents. In Pakistan the 
legitimacy problem was compounded because the ruling coalition was getting security aid in 
exchange for supporting the U.S. war in Afghanistan, which was perceived by many Pakistanis 
to be illegitimate. 
 
 The first section of this article outlines the analytical framework describing how 
economic development and political stability are related to the competition over economic and 
political rents. The second section provides an overview of aid to the two countries. The third 
section evaluates the likely effects of aid on the two countries using our analytical framework, 
and the fourth section offers some concluding thoughts.  
 
 
Governance, institutions, and development 
I analyze the effects of aid on governance using the language of rents and rent-seeking. State 
policies and interventions create rents, which are incremental incomes that would not exist in 
the absence of particular policies or interventions. Rents can have a legal or illegal origin (taxes 
or aid versus expropriation) and they can be allocated in legal or extra-legal ways (subsidies 
and protection versus illegal allocations of public contracts or allowing corruption by political 
supporters). Politics involves organizations mobilizing with the purpose of maintaining or 
changing the allocation of rents. Their activities, both legal and illegal, can be broadly 
described as “rent-seeking,” as they seek to preserve or change the allocation of rents. In 
advanced countries, politics is based on largely legal processes of rent-seeking, and political 
activities are legally financed by social interests. The aim of politics is to change legal rents 
through changes in taxes, subsidies, and regulations. 
 
 In developing countries a much larger part of the rent-seeking is funded by money from 
gray sources, partly because formally organized social interests cannot fully finance politics. 
In addition, more of the rents are created and allocated in extra-legal ways as the legal fiscal 
and regulatory capacities of the state are limited. Powerful political organizers and 
constituencies typically capture off-budget or illegal rents (Khan 2005; North et al. 2007, 
2013). There are, therefore, some structural reasons why developing countries generally do not 
display characteristics of “good governance,” defined as governance according to the rule of 
law, the protection of property rights, and low corruption. However, while no developing 
country scores well on good governance, there are significant differences in the organization 
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of politics that can make a big difference to development outcomes. Aid in these contexts is 
important because it can change the supply of rents, the ways in which these rents are allocated, 
and the strategies of different political players. 
 
 Two broad propositions structure our discussion. The first is that a gradual 
incorporation of politically organized groups into legitimate (though not necessarily legal) 
processes of political accumulation is a precondition for maintaining social and political 
stability in developing countries. Political organizations can use a variety of ideological claims 
to define themselves. Nevertheless, at the heart of most conflicts that are ostensibly ethnic, 
religious, regional, or ideological there is often a dissatisfied but effective group of organizers 
that feel their access to rents is less than is warranted by their organizational strength. A country 
that is on a steady growth path and where the structure of political competition allows the 
gradual inclusion of new groups is likely to have systemic stability even if its politics appears 
to be disorderly. On the other hand, a country where the ruling coalition uses an aggressive 
strategy of suppressing new organizers and buying out some of their supporters from above 
may appear to be more stable but may build up explosive pressures. This is even more likely 
to be the case if economic growth is low, limiting the resources that are available for 
redistribution over time.  
 
 Developing countries are therefore more likely to be stable when excluded groups 
perceive a good chance of gaining access to rents commensurate with their organizational 
power. Organizational power can be demonstrated in ways that are relatively peaceful, such as 
public demonstrations or electoral conflicts. But if these types of competition are suppressed 
or if legal demonstrations of effective power fail to be accommodated, more disruptive or 
violent conflicts can break out. This can escalate into conflicts that can last a long time until 
the distribution of rents comes into line with perceptions of the distribution of power that all 
parties accept as realistic. Societies where challenges to the distribution of rents are incremental 
and new groups entering the political fray are similar to the ones that are already beneficiaries 
are more likely to make incremental compromises. However, if many groups are excluded for 
a long time, their mobilization can result in significant violence because substantial changes in 
the distribution of rents become necessary. In these contexts a long period of intense conflict 
can follow and excluded groups may mobilize for overthrowing the political system in its 
entirety (Khan 2010). This is why democratic processes that appear to be equally messy can be 
associated with stability in some developing countries and sudden escalations of instability in 
others. 
  
 A second and related proposition is that political rent allocation processes should be 
consistent with (or at least should not block) rent allocation to emerging productive sectors to 
develop their competitiveness in a global economy. Rents are often required for economic 
development to help overcome market failures. Business-government links may be necessary 
for protecting property rights and getting access to resources in contexts where the formal rule 
of law, the protection of property rights, and the formal policy framework are weak. Support 
may also be essential for developing technical and organizational capabilities necessary for 
competitiveness. Many firms in developing countries are not competitive because they lack 
organizational capabilities. Rents that can be managed with appropriate conditions can be very 
important for supporting the development of competitive capabilities (Khan 2012b; Rodrik 
2007, 99–152). However, business-government links can also end up protecting inefficiency 
and in these cases the result could be economic stagnation and even decline.  
 
 Given these structural features of developing countries, it is misleading to try to identify 
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the content of what is retrogressive or developmental by using the benchmark of “good 
governance” defined by the protection of property rights, the enforcement of a rule of law, low 
corruption, and a government that is accountable. These conditions are likely to be absent in 
developing countries regardless of their developmental success. Rule-following societies with 
“Weberian” states generally emerge when there are many economic organizations that are 
productive enough to be profitable in rule-following ways and profitable enough to collectively 
pay for the enforcement of these rules. Politics becomes rule-following when contributions 
from legal organizations provide enough resources to pay for political activity and formal 
taxation provides enough resources for parties to win elections on the basis of their manifestos. 
These conditions are typically not met in developing countries. Developmental success requires 
governance arrangements that can achieve political stability and growth in these adverse 
contexts (Khan 2000b, 2000a, 2004, 2012b). With sustained developmental success, 
improvements in good governance may be achieved over a longer term. This is not assured, 
but if development with acceptable levels of stability is not sustained, moves toward good 
governance are very unlikely. Since aid is a source of rents, the effects of aid on governance 
have to be understood in the context of the interaction of structures of aid with these ongoing 
processes of rent allocation.  
 
Aid to Bangladesh and Pakistan: historical trends 
Figure 1shows the relative performance of the two countries in terms of per capita incomes. 
The gap in their incomes widened until the 1980s but then began to rapidly narrow as growth 
accelerated in Bangladesh and decelerated in Pakistan.  
FIGURE 1 Trends in Per Capita Incomes: Bangladesh and Pakistan 
  
Source: Based on data in World Bank (2013).  
 Table 1 and Table 2 show that in nominal terms aid to Bangladesh roughly doubled 
between the 1970s and the 2000s while in Pakistan it more than tripled. However, since both 
countries’ populations roughly doubled over this period, per capita aid to Bangladesh remained 
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
6
6.2
6.4
6.6
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
Lo
gs
 o
f P
er
 C
ap
ita
 In
co
m
e 
in
 C
on
st
an
t 
20
00
 $
Bangladesh Pakistan
6 
virtually constant in nominal terms over the period, while it increased by a third in Pakistan. In 
real terms, per capita aid declined to a third of its initial level in Bangladesh and to half in 
Pakistan. While the decline in real aid per capita was less steep in Pakistan, its economic growth 
and political stability fared worse. 
 
TABLE 1 Trends in Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Bangladesh 
 Average Annual 
ODA Current 
Dollars (million) 
Aid Per Capita in 
Current Dollars 
Average Annual 
ODA Constant 2011 
Dollars (million) 
Aid Per Capita 
in Constant 
2011 Dollars 
1971-80 699.0 9.90 2422.2 34.32 
1981-90 1452.0 15.73 3182.8 34.49 
1991-00 1390.2 11.83 2101.5 17.89 
2000-10 1352.5 9.62 1643.5 11.69 
Source: Based on data in OECD (2013). Per capita figures based on mid-decade population 
figures from World Bank (2013). 
 
TABLE 2 Trends in Total ODA to Pakistan 
 Average Annual 
ODA Current 
Dollars (million) 
Aid Per Capita in 
Current Dollars 
Average Annual 
ODA Constant 2011 
Dollars (million) 
Aid Per Capita 
in Constant 
2011 Dollars 
1961-70 413.1 7.95 2719.3 52.30 
1971-80 640.1 9.35 2348.1 34.29 
1981-90 957.5 10.03 2068.5 21.67 
1991-00 1037.2 8.14 1508.2 11.84 
2000-10 1995.7 12.58 2400.8 15.13 
Source: Based on data in OECD (2013). Per capita figures based on mid-decade population 
figures from World Bank (2013).  
 Bangladesh was a war-ravaged country in 1971 and in the early years more than 70 
percent of its aid was food and commodity aid. By the 2000s these had declined to 6 percent, 
with project aid increasing to 94 percent (Government of Bangladesh 2011, Tables 1 and 2). 
However, aid continued to finance almost half of public investment. The Annual Development 
Program or ADP financed public infrastructure and developmental projects. In the early years, 
aid disbursements covered all of the ADP and by 2000 it still accounted for 46.8 percent 
(Sobhan 1990;  Obaydullah 2007, 181). Over time the share of grants declined and the share 
of concessional loans increased from less than half in the 1970s to almost 70 percent of total 
aid by the 2000s (Government of Bangladesh 2011, Table 3). 
 
 The sources of aid to Bangladesh from 1971 to 2010 were quite different from Pakistan. 
Multilateral loans from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Islamic 
Development Bank accounted for around 40 percent of aid to Bangladesh. Of the bilateral 
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donors, Japan was initially the biggest, accounting for 13.4 percent of the total. The United 
States followed with less than 7 percent over this period as a whole. The share of aid from the 
United States declined over time and in the 2000s accounted for less than 2 percent of total aid 
to Bangladesh (Government of Bangladesh 2011, Table 4). The UK became the biggest 
bilateral donor in 2004, followed by Japan. In contrast, U.S. aid played a much more important 
role in Pakistan. 
 
 The institutional weaknesses of the Bangladeshi state in the 1970s were somewhat 
offset by the emergence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). They were promoted by 
donors not only because of their efficiency in some types of aid delivery but also because it 
was claimed they represented and empowered the poor (White 1999). These strategies were 
consistent with the ideological preference for liberalization and against state provision in the 
1980s. Some Bangladeshi NGOs such as BRAC (formerly the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee) did indeed achieve good results in aid delivery, particularly to women and in 
remote areas. The share of aid channeled through NGOs has continued to grow. In 1990–91, 
10.5 percent of total aid went through NGOs, and this grew to around 30 percent of the total 
by 2005 (World Bank 2006, Table 3.1). However, doubts were expressed from the outset about 
the NGO model of aid delivery. Such doubts included concern about the extent to which NGOs 
actually represented the poor (Stiles 2002; White 1999; World Bank 2006). Nevertheless, 
NGOs ensured that a significant chunk of aid was allocated by organizations led by the broader 
intermediate classes. Comparable figures for the share of aid going through Pakistani NGOs 
are not easily available. This is partly because of Pakistan’s federal structure and partly because 
data from many donors are not easily available. The share of aid going through all NGOs may 
be comparable to Bangladesh, but there are few large Pakistani NGOs such as BRAC, ASA, 
or the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (which is a bank with many characteristics of an NGO). 
Pakistani NGOs are relatively small and much of USAID spending in Pakistan in the 2000s, 
for instance, was routed through international (primarily U.S.) NGOs (Cheema 2009). 
  
 In the 1990s aid conditions changed further with the emergence of the “good 
governance” consensus (Khan 2004, 2007; Hermes and Lensink 2001). Achieving 
improvements in “good governance” become an important aim of World Bank lending to 
Bangladesh, and other multilateral and bilateral donors began to follow this lead (Parnini 2009). 
From 2003 on, Bangladesh was encouraged to claim “ownership” of good governance priorities 
in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which provided a framework for coordinating aid 
(Government of Bangladesh 2005, 2009, 2003). The swing in the donor consensus was very 
similar in Pakistan with a focus on good governance and economic liberalization, and a similar 
focus on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Anwar 2002; Government of Pakistan 2003, 
2010). 
  
 Bangladesh’s growth accelerated in the 1980s and further in the 1990s, but not because 
it made any progress in terms of indicators of good governance. Indeed on some of these 
indicators it actually retrogressed, leading the World Bank to describe Bangladesh as a 
“paradox” and a “conundrum” (World Bank 2007). In contrast, Pakistan’s growth decelerated 
in the 1990s, with a particularly disappointing performance in its industrial sector. While it is 
hard to argue that aid had positive effects in Pakistan, much of the economic evaluation of aid 
in Bangladesh also concludes that aid had limited or negative effects on long-term growth. 
Razzaque and Ahmed (2000) argue on the basis of an econometric study that aid had a negative 
long-term effect on domestic savings in Bangladesh between 1973 and 1998. Quazi (2005) 
argues that the effect of aid on growth was marginal over 1973–99 because the positive effect 
of loans (which typically finance investment) was diluted by the consumption-enhancing 
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effects of grants. Islam (1992) argues that over 1972–88 foreign resources made no significant 
contribution to growth but loans were more effective than grants.  
 
 This implicit conclusion that Bangladesh may have done just as well or even better 
without aid is not plausible for a number of reasons. First, relationships that hold for small 
variations in aid may not hold for big changes. If the econometric evidence suggests that a 
5 percent fall in aid is offset by an x percent rise in domestic savings (where x may even be 
more than five) it does not follow that a 100 percent fall in aid would be offset by a 20x percent 
rise in domestic savings. Such significant offsetting effects are likely to require major 
institutional changes. A serious disruption of aid would indeed create a challenge but the 
outcomes of shocks are unpredictable and may well result in responses that are damaging rather 
than supportive of developmental outcomes. Second, the econometric identification of the 
effect of aid works by testing a fixed structure of lagged effects in time series data. This 
approach may fail to identify the contribution of aid if effects have a changing magnitude and 
lag over time, which is plausible because the types of aid and other policies have been changing. 
It may be more useful to analytically examine plausible political economy links among aid, 
governance, and economic performance that may not be testable using econometric approaches 
but may be suggestive enough to support deeper empirical investigation.  
 
FIGURE 2 U.S. Economic and Military Aid to Pakistan 1950–2010 
 
Source: Based on data in Elhai (2011) 
The configuration of aid flows to Pakistan displays some significant differences compared to 
Bangladesh. Three critical characteristics stand out in the data. First, aid from the United States 
has been a significant part of the overall aid received by Pakistan. From 1971 to 2010, the share 
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of U.S. aid to Pakistan was on average around 20 percent of total aid. At its high point in the 
1960s the share of U.S. aid was almost 70 percent of the total and in the 2000s it was around 
23 percent (OECD 2013) This compares with less than 7 percent of aid to Bangladesh coming 
from the United States over 1971–2010. Second, the total volume of U.S. economic aid to 
Pakistan has been strongly correlated with the volume of U.S. military aid. This can be seen in 
the data collated by Elhai (2011) and summarized in Figure 2. In contrast, U.S. military aid to 
Bangladesh has been negligible, reflecting the very different strategic significance of the 
country for the United States. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, military aid to Pakistan fluctuated enormously with changing 
U.S. regional strategies, with implications for overall aid flows to the country, as can be seen 
in Figure 2. The first sudden cutback happened when military aid was terminated after Pakistan 
went to war with India in 1965. U.S. military aid to Pakistan remained negligible throughout 
the 1970s. Economic aid also declined and kept falling after the 1971 war with India that 
resulted in the birth of Bangladesh. In the early 1970s the Socialist regime of Bhutto with its 
policies of nationalization attracted little economic assistance from the United States. In 1977 
General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto in a military coup and executed him in 1979. In one of 
the unfortunate coincidences of history, Zia’s coup happened at exactly the time that the Soviets 
invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and U.S. aid policies dramatically changed as Pakistan became a 
frontline state in the Afghan war.  
 
 U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan shot up in the 1980s while Pakistan was 
playing a critical role in the war in Afghanistan. In 1988 the Soviets were defeated and with 
that Pakistan’s importance for U.S. regional policy collapsed. In 1988 General Zia also died in 
a mysterious air crash and was succeeded by the democratic government of Benazir Bhutto, 
daughter of the man Zia had executed. But now U.S. aid to Pakistan collapsed, ostensibly 
because of its nuclear program. In 1985, Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, which 
made aid to Pakistan conditional on an annual presidential certification that Pakistan did not 
possess a nuclear weapon. The required annual certification was provided by U.S. presidents 
while the war in Afghanistan was going on. However, when the war ended President George 
H. W. Bush decided he could no longer provide the requisite certification (ICG 2012, 2–3). 
Military and economic aid to Pakistan dropped precipitately with a corresponding decline in 
the trust between the two countries. 
 
 The 1990s was a period of weak civilian governments, intense internal political 
conflicts, and the lowest growth rates in Pakistan’s history. U.S. economic aid was close to 
zero through this period, but aid from multilateral and other bilateral donors kept overall levels 
of aid stable in nominal terms. However, peacetime aid was now increasingly linked to the new 
agenda of achieving ‘good governance’. The decade of low growth ended with another crisis 
as Pakistan responded to Indian nuclear tests in 1998 with its own tests and became a nuclear 
armed country. Economic sanctions followed and Pakistan’s isolation increased further with 
the military coup that brought General Musharraf to power in 1999. The resource constraints 
and political conflicts that were emerging may have led to a shift in the strategies of the state 
elites but in another fateful coincidence, 9/11 followed and Pakistan once again became a 
frontline state. US military aid shot up again, followed by a rise in economic aid, and this time 
military aid outstripped economic aid (Zaidi 2011). Musharraf stayed in power until 2007 when 
he was brought down by a movement for the restoration of democracy. The precipitate growth 
of military and civilian aid in the 2000s was to have far-reaching and largely negative effects 
on Pakistan’s economic and political trajectory.  
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 The Pakistani perception that the United States was only interested in pursuing its own 
security interests was of course ultimately damaging for U.S. influence. By the late 2000s, and 
particularly after the restoration of democracy in 2007, the United States was forced to 
reevaluate its aid strategy. In 2009 the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, also known as the Enhanced 
Partnership with Pakistan Act, authorized a tripling of civilian aid to $7.5 billion over five 
years. To help strengthen the government, the U.S. decided that more aid would be channeled 
through government institutions rather than (largely international) NGOs. However, the 
proposed expansion of civilian aid did not take place. The U.S. relationship with Pakistan 
deteriorated after the raid in May 2011 that targeted Osama bin Laden and NATO airstrikes in 
November that killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers (ICG 2012). New security concerns, a 
Pakistani reluctance to authorize projects involving international NGOs, and the weakness of 
government agencies disbursing aid meant that the proposed increase in civilian aid was not 
achieved. 
  
 The utility of Pakistan as a launching pad for U.S. security strategies in the region has 
clearly varied over time but this does not explain why U.S. aid flows to Pakistan were so 
volatile over the last four decades. It would have been more rational for the United States to 
sustain a flow of economic aid to maintain a close relationship with Pakistan over time. The 
growing doubts on the Pakistani side about U.S. intentions are likely to have contributed to the 
Pakistanis hedging their bets in ways that the United States in turn found increasingly irksome. 
For instance, the Pakistanis often appeared to be dragging their feet in fighting the Afghan 
Taliban. This could be entirely rational from the Pakistani perspective if they believed the U.S. 
would withdraw aid from Pakistan once the Taliban were defeated. Since strategic planners on 
the U.S. side must have understood this, we need to explain why U.S. aid to Pakistan has been 
so volatile in the past. An important factor may have been successful lobbying on the part of 
India, in a context where the United States was increasingly interested in maintaining good 
relations with India for economic and political reasons. This could explain why aid to Pakistan 
was repeatedly cut when moments of crisis passed (Anwar and Michaelowa 2006). 
  
 Aid to Pakistan in the 2000s was very different from the 1950s and 1960s when it was 
closely linked to development projects. In 1964 aid amounted to around 5 percent of GDP, with 
GDP growing at almost 7 percent a year (Zaidi 2011, 3). At that time U.S. aid accounted for 
around 67 percent of all ODA and was almost entirely economic aid. The first half of the 1960s 
was the most dynamic growth period in Pakistan’s history, and aid was an important contributor 
to that growth (Amjad 1982). It is not surprising that the popularity of the United States in 
Pakistan was also at its peak during this period. Aid provided finance for lending by 
development banks such as the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) and the 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), which provided credit on easy 
terms for investors in new sectors. Both the internal political arrangements and aid flows were 
disrupted in the second half of the 1960s and neither were to be reconstituted in quite the same 
way again (Khan 1999). Constructive critics of the U.S. aid strategy in Pakistan have argued 
that if U.S. goals in Pakistan are to be realized, aid has to be targeted once more toward 
developmental outcomes. This would require, for instance, using more of the aid to co-finance 
private investments and insure against investment risks in difficult areas, and to support 
infrastructure projects (Birdsall, Elhai, and Kinder 2011).  
11 
 Aid and institution-building in Bangladesh and Pakistan 
Aid was thus associated with very different outcomes in the two countries even though in the 
early 1970s Pakistan and Bangladesh appeared to have some similarities. Immediately after 
1971 both went through a period of populist authoritarianism and “Socialism” with Bhutto in 
Pakistan and Sheikh Mujib (the first prime minister and then president) in Bangladesh. In both 
cases nationalization was used to create jobs for party supporters. In both, charismatic leaders 
used increasingly authoritarian methods to control growing demands for rents. In Bangladesh 
the authoritarianism ultimately took the form of a one-party state while in Pakistan Bhutto was 
accused of winning elections by rigging and murdering his political opponents (Burki 1980; 
Wolpert 1993; Khan 2012a, 2013).  
 
 Despite these similarities there were important differences between the two countries. 
In Bangladesh the war had destroyed the political power of the previously dominant economic 
and political classes. Many of the old elites were non-Bengali, and simply left the country at 
its independence. The few Bengali capitalists were also expropriated through nationalizations 
in the early 1970s. Political competition was now driven by new political entrepreneurs from 
the previously excluded lower-middle classes. The competition for rents among these new 
groups was intense and resulted in political turbulence and violence, initially within the Awami 
League and then between it and factions that began to defect from it. However, on the economic 
front, this process also resulted in the emergence of entirely new classes with money, some 
members of which could potentially become part of a new productive class.  
 
 In Pakistan, Bhutto mobilized the poor but there was no equivalent political rupture 
with the past as in Bangladesh. Much of the old political classes remained in control of political 
organizations and rents. The potential upward mobility of new lower-middle class political 
organizers was much more limited. Bhutto’s attack on big capitalists through nationalizations 
did inflict a blow on the old economically dominant classes. But here there was no equivalent 
political rupture that would allow new classes of moneyed individuals to emerge from below 
through rent capture based on the mobilization of political power. Thus, Bhutto’s strategy in 
Pakistan had a double negative effect on economic dynamism. The old capitalist class that may 
have played a productive role in a new cycle of investment was weakened and demoralized. 
But a new class of medium-sized capitalists, with the potential for developing smaller firms 
using cheaper labor-intensive technologies, was also constrained from emerging from below. 
 
 As the competition for rents became more intense in Bangladesh, Mujib attempted to 
contain it with the imposition of one-party rule in 1974. The attempt to curtail organizational 
rights coincided with a famine that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and the regime lost 
its legitimacy. In August 1975 Mujib and most of his family were assassinated and the military 
took over. After a period of uncertainty General Zia-ur-Rahman, a popular freedom fighter, 
became president in 1977. Zia introduced “authoritarian clientelism,” a system of controlled 
democracy that reintroduced multiparty competition. The strategy was to encourage multi-
party political competition to identify the most powerful and effective organizers and to 
incorporate them within the ruling party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, or BNP. Mujib’s 
failed one-party experiment proved that the social mobilizations unleashed in Bangladesh after 
1971 would be difficult to repress and control from above. In the absence of large resource 
flows to the top leadership in the form of security aid or natural resource rents, such a strategy 
was never again contemplated. Instead, Zia allowed aspiring political organizers to capture 
12 
rents in the form of business contracts and opportunities, as long as the position of the president 
was not challenged. This resulted in the rapid emergence of new political elites and a new class 
of medium-sized economic entrepreneurs (Khan 2012a, 2013). 
 
 As political entrepreneurs saw that they could compete for rents without recourse to 
extremist politics, political violence declined. This period also created the foundations for an 
economic turnaround as the emerging moneyed class was drawn into the garment industry that 
was to transform Bangladeshi manufacturing. Zia sought to achieve stability and legitimacy by 
providing policy support for investors in new sectors; he provided assurances and policy 
support to foreign investors and technology providers and they found this credible because they 
could see he meant business. These steps were critical for the emergence of the garment 
industry in the late 1970s, which by 2012 employed almost five million workers and earned 80 
percent of Bangladesh’s foreign exchange (Khan 2012a, 2013). However, the competition for 
the presidency was intense within the army and eventually resulted in Zia’s assassination. He 
was replaced by the much less popular Ershad who faced increasing challenges from opposition 
parties. Ershad was forced out in 1990 and since then there has been a competitive democracy 
with power alternating between the BNP and the Awami League. However, political stability 
has been vulnerable with periodic crises when parties failed to agree about the conduct of 
elections. 
 
 In Pakistan, Bhutto was also overthrown in a military coup in 1977. Pakistan’s ruler 
was also a General Zia, but his military rule was much more authoritarian and centralized, 
helped by the upsurge in U.S. security aid following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Ultimately, the resources controlled by the centre allowed it to by-pass and repress emerging 
intermediate class forces and to patronize weak organizations that provided short-term support 
for the regime. Pakistan’s Zia appeared to be encouraging new social forces as he tried to 
bypass Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) by promoting weaker political organizations 
such as the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and by encouraging the formation of new Islamist 
groups. However, in the end, Zia’s strategy did not result in any fundamental change in the 
composition of the groups that dominated politics in Pakistan. The new Islamist parties he 
patronized with money from above did not represent the most powerful intermediate class 
organizers and in the end they were not incorporated into the dominant structures of rent 
allocation. The biggest beneficiary was the PML, eventually led by Nawaz Sharif. The Sharif 
brothers, however, were not political newcomers but representatives of an established business 
family. Their party had some appeal for the existing business community but created limited 
spaces for new aspirants from the intermediate classes. Thus, despite Zia’s rhetoric of radical 
Islamism and his antipathy to the established order, the dominant political classes remained 
substantially unchanged at the end of his rule (Lieven 2011, 76–80).  
 
 The effects of the steep increase in military aid to Pakistan in the 1980s can be 
understood by imagining the counterfactual: what would have happened if the military and 
political establishment did not have access to these rents at this time. Without the significant 
spike in security-related aid, Zia would not have had the resources to buy off the more pliable 
lower-level organizers from above and suppress others. He would have been forced to 
recognize a broader base of powerful groups, and without the cash to buy them off, he may 
have been forced to provide them with rents in the form of business opportunities and bank 
finance, as in Bangladesh. Pakistan’s President Zia did support the Sharif brothers in the PML, 
but as political entrepreneurs to balance the PPP, not as economic entrepreneurs who would 
bring in new technologies to create jobs. Unlike Zia in Bangladesh, he did not feel compelled 
to push a broad base of new capitalists toward global competitiveness and not surprisingly, 
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investors did not find his pro-business statements very credible. Instead, Pakistan’s Zia 
achieved what Lieven described as “shallow” economic growth, based on a service and 
construction boom financed by cash inflows from aid and remittances from Pakistanis in the 
Middle East (Lieven 2011, 78). 
 
 The 1990s saw a return to democracy in both countries, but a democracy that was 
vulnerable because of intense conflicts between competing parties. The 1990s also witnessed 
a policy shift among donors toward providing support for liberalization and good governance 
reforms. The large flows of security-related aid to Pakistan died out in the 1990s and both 
countries were encouraged to adopt liberalizing policies and “good governance” reforms. But 
liberalization had different effects in the two countries. In Bangladesh the garment industry 
was emerging out of the policy support provided in the late 1970s and 1980s and steps towards 
liberalization assisted its rapid growth throughout the 1990s. In Pakistan there were no new 
globally competitive industries that could benefit from liberalization. In fact, Pakistan’s growth 
rate collapsed in the 1990s and Bangladesh achieved a higher growth rate from then onwards. 
To make matters worse, the steep cutback in U.S. aid to Pakistan in the 1990s happened 
immediately after military rule ended in 1988. The sudden reduction in aid rents before an 
alternative ruling coalition could consolidate adversely affected political stability. No elected 
party managed to complete a term in office in the 1990s. Aid from multilateral sources targeted 
governance reforms such as decentralization but the real challenge was to create a new ruling 
coalition based on a new distribution of rents. Given the difficulties of institutionalizing good 
governance in poor countries, it is not surprising that aid supporting these reforms had a very 
limited impact on economic development or political stability (Cheema, Khwaja, and Qadir 
2005).  
 
 Both Pakistan and Bangladesh suffered suspensions of democracy in the 2000s. 
Democracy in Pakistan was suspended under Musharraf from 1999 to 2007 while Bangladesh 
had a two-year emergency government from 2007 to 2009 following an electoral crisis in 2007. 
The Bangladeshi emergency government, led by an ex-World Bank bureaucrat, Fakhruddin 
Ahmed, and backed by the army, enjoyed the support of donors as it promised to carry out a 
raft of good governance measures under emergency laws. Such measures included an 
anticorruption drive that swept up the leaders of the two main parties and thousands of others. 
The result turned out to be a missed opportunity because the good governance reforms 
attempted were actually unattainable and the government failed to identify feasible reforms 
that may have made a difference to real political and economic outcomes (Khan 2012a).  
 
 The Musharraf interregnum in Pakistan lasted much longer and arguably did much 
more damage to Pakistan’s developmental prospects. Once again it was unfortunate for 
Pakistan that a military coup was closely followed by a massive upsurge in military aid. This 
time the security aid did not just enable a top-down allocation of rents with its damaging 
political consequences. Pakistan’s political elites now suffered a new crisis of legitimacy as 
U.S. aims in the region were now widely opposed in Pakistan. The military-bureaucratic elite 
in Pakistan sought to satisfy both the United States and its own people and ended up satisfying 
neither. Musharraf later argued in his memoirs that the Americans had given him an ultimatum 
after 9/11 to fall in line or “be bombed back to the Stone Age” (Musharraf 2006, 200–1), a 
charge the U.S. denied.  What is clear is that once again the direction of significant security aid 
to the top leadership blocked the incremental inclusion of new political organizers with their 
own autonomous organizational capabilities.  
 
 The lure of significant centralized aid flows was such that even after 2008 when a new 
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PPP government was elected to power, it was willing to accept security-related aid flows from 
the United States with no significant change in the strategy for remaining in power. The PML-
N that formed a coalition government after the 2013 elections was committed to a renegotiation 
of the security alliance with the United States in the context of waning U.S. interest in 
Afghanistan. But sustainable changes in U.S. strategies towards Pakistan may be disrupted by 
new crises in the region. Thus, in Pakistan while the good governance rhetoric of Musharraf 
was similar to that of Fakhruddin, the implications were much more severe than wasted 
opportunities for feasible reform. The outcome was a growth in violence from suppressed 
organized groups in society that could exploit the growing loss of state legitimacy to mount 
increasingly violent challenges even after the return of democracy in 2008. 
 
Conclusion 
Aid can affect economic and political outcomes by modifying rent-seeking behavior. The 
interaction of aid with preexisting economic and political processes can result in cycles of 
cumulative causation that can be good or bad for economic and political development. An 
analysis of the effects of foreign assistance has to take into account the initial structure of 
economic and political organizations in a country and the ways in which they are competing 
for rents. While aid was a relatively small part of the GNP of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
when we look at these interactive effects, aid arguably had significant multiplier effects on the 
evolution of social stability and economic dynamism in both countries.  
 
 Our analysis questions critical elements of the current consensus on aid. In countries 
such as Pakistan that face significant internal violence, the current consensus on security and 
development suggests that development aid should have a security focus (World Bank 2011). 
However, when we look at the organization of political rent seeking in Pakistan, the delivery 
of security-related aid had adverse effects on the evolution of viable political strategies with 
damaging long-term implications. Security-related aid in the 1980s allowed the ruling elites to 
block the incremental inclusion of powerful political organizers from the intermediate classes 
and built up conflicts for the future. The second upsurge of security-related aid in the 2000s 
had even more serious consequences for the country by undermining the legitimacy of the state 
and allowing excluded groups to mobilize using extremist agendas. Donors are clearly wrong 
if they believe that their security interests can in general be furthered by ramping up security-
related aid to client states. Aid interfaces with internal political and economic processes of 
competition over rents that are country specific. It could be argued that countries similar to 
Pakistan could always renegotiate or opt out of assistance that is so damaging. The problem is 
that negotiations over aid are carried out by the very elites who benefit from aid. It is therefore 
also important to persuade donors that a simple-minded security strategy may harm their own 
long-term security interests if the countries they are assisting become more fragile and violent 
as a result.  
 
 In less violent countries such as Bangladesh, the consensus view is that development 
requires progress toward good governance. This is true in a longer view, but the challenge is 
to understand better the country-specific processes through which economic and political 
progress has actually been achieved and to build on it. Attempting to use aid as an instrument 
to directly achieve good governance has repeatedly proved to be a misguided strategy. These 
attempts resulted in missed opportunities of supporting feasible institutional improvements to 
sustain development. Sustaining development may in turn be the most feasible way of 
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strengthening good governance over time. Developmental rent allocations succeeded in 
creating new sectors such as garment and textiles in Bangladesh, and the challenge is to 
understand these examples so that policy and assistance can be appropriately used to assist new 
sectors such as electronics or shipbuilding (Khan 2013). Once again, country specificities are 
important and the possible interactions of aid and domestic accumulation processes need to be 
much better understood.  
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